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Ved P. Nanda*
Ethnic Conflict in Fiji and
International Human Rights Law**
I. Ethnic Conflict in Fiji
A. Introduction
As a small island nation in the South Pacific, Fiji once enjoyed the repu-
tation of a model democracy based on pluralism and ethnic harmony.1
Today that reputation is marred by racial tension, economic uncertainty,
and political instability, the latter triggered by two successive military
coups-on May 14 and September 26, 1987, respectively-by Sitiveni
Rabuka, then a lieutenant colonel in the Fijian army.2 Although Rabuka
initially claimed he had acted to prevent racial violence and to maintain
law and order,3 both coups instead exacerbated the simmering ethnic
conflict between indigenous Fijians and people of Indian origin living in
Fiji.
Following the coups, Rabuka abrogated the constitution, declared
himself head of state, proclaimed Fiji a republic, and announced the for-
* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International Legal
Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the
research assistance of Mark Modzelewski, a third-year law student at the University of
Denver College of Law.
** This is an expanded version of remarks made by the author at the Cornell
International Law Journal's twenty-fifth anniversary symposium, "The Nations Within,"
on March 7, 1992.
1. For an introduction to Fiji, see generally DERYCK SCARR, Fiji: A SHORT His-
TORY (1984); ISIRELI Q. LASAQA, THE FIJIAN PEOPLE BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPEN-
DENCE (1984); and POLITICS IN Fiji: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY (Brij V. Lal
ed., 1986).
2. On reports of the coups, see generally VICTOR LAL, FIJI, COUPS IN PARADISE:
RACE, POLITICS AND MILITARY INTERVENTION (1990); F"i, 39 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS
REV. 3 (1987) [hereinafter 39 L.CJ. REV.]; Fyi, 40 INT'L COMM'NJURISTS REV. 3 (1988)
[hereinafter 40 I.CJ. REv.]; AMNESTY INT'L REP. 156 (1988); Ramesh Thakur &
Antony Wood, Fiji in Crisis, 43 WORLD TODAY 206 (1988); and Richard N. Kiwanuka,
On Revolution and Legality in Fiji, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 961, 961-65 (1988). On
March 20, 1990, Luis Kutner, President, Commission for International Due Process
of Law, and the authorjointly submitted a petition to the United Nations on behalf of
"Fiji nationals deprived of the right of self-determination." See U.N. Center for
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. G/SO 215/1, Fiji, April 12, 1990 (letter acknowledging
receipt of the communication.) A copy of the petition is available from the author.
3. See 39 I.C.J. REV., supra note 2, at 5.
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mation of a new council of ministers.4 In Canada, at an October 18,
1987 meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government, Fiji's mem-
bership in the commonwealth lapsed because of the change in Fiji's sta-
tus. Rabuka stepped down as the head of state on December 6, 1987. A
new regime promulgated a new constitution in July 1990, which ensured
that indigenous Fijians will always control the government. 5 Those facts
are not in dispute. The difficult question is: How are the different,
often competing, group interests of Fiji's people to be reconciled? To
appreciate fully the present dilemma, one must first consider the current
problem in a historical setting and in some detail.
B. Background
Fiji has long been a country with two dominant races: indigenous
natives and people of Indian origin. This mix resulted originally from
the British Government's importation of indentured Indian laborers
into Fiji following the island's British colonization in the 19th century.
At the time of the May 14, 1987, coup, Fiji's total population of 785,000
was 48.4 percent people of Indian origin and 46.2 percent indigenous
Fijians-a mixture of Melanesians and Polynesians. The remainder of
the population consisted primarily of European and Chinese stock.
The government and the traditional power structure within Fiji
have always favored the indigenous Fijian population with respect to
land ownership and control. The British-dominated colonial govern-
ment traditionally guaranteed Indians secure and sufficient leaseholds,
but the colonial government kept the Indian and Fijian communities
institutionally and physically separate. Because many countries' consti-
tutions provide special measures or privileges for certain groups, few
Indian descendants seriously questioned these measures in Fiji. As a
result, indigenous Fijians today own eighty-five percent of the land;
Indians own only 1.7 percent.
C. 1970 Constitution
A British colony since the late 1800s, Fiji became independent on Octo-
ber 10, 1970, but retained the Queen of England, represented by a Gov-
ernor-General, as head of state and became a member of the British
Commonwealth. Fiji also instituted a new constitution, which continued
to favor indigenous Fijians.
The 1970 constitution guaranteed the rights of the Great Council of
Chiefs and the Fijian Affairs Board, both composed of indigenous Fiji-
ans. Moreover, the constitution allowed the Council of Chiefs to submit
recommendations directly to the Governor-General and required con-
sultation of the Fijian Affairs Board before several important legislative
4. See generally note 2. The following description is primarily based on the
reports cited there.
5. Kalinga Seneviratne, Fiji: "Apartheid" Constitution Stirs Ethnic Tension, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File [here-
inafter "Apartheid" Constitution].
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and executive functions could be carried out. Further, the constitution
assured control of all "native" land to Fijians through the Fijian-domi-
nated Native Land Trust Board.
The constitution also created a twenty-two-member senate, the
composition of which assured control to the indigenous population.
The Senate held a complete veto power over any legislation that would
affect Fijian land, customs, or customary interests. No significant consti-
tutional changes could be made without two-thirds Senate approval.
Members of a lower house of Parliament were elected through an
electoral system based on three electoral rolls, one each for Fijians, Indi-
ans, and minorities (the "general" roll). The Indians and Fijians each
received twenty-two seats and the general voters received eight in this
lower house arrangement.
Two parties-the Fijian-dominated Alliance Party (the Alliance) and
the Indian-based National Federation Party (the NFP)-traditionally
dominated Fijian politics; but from at least the mid-seventies onward,
party factionalism occurred frequently. It is noteworthy that the 1970
constitution did not allow Indians, by themselves, to form a majority
government.
The Fijian-dominated Alliance Party's Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara con-
tinued as Prime Minister until the 1987 election. Reflecting social
change, however, the Fiji Labour Party formed in July 1985 as the polit-
ical expression of the country's professionals (of whom four-fifths are
Indians) and others, including many Fijians. "The Labour Party is a
genuinely non-racial party and eroded the support of both the Alliance
and the NFP." 6 In the 1987 election, as a coalition with the NFP, the
Labour Party won twenty-eight seats to the Alliance Party's twenty-four.
The coalition owed its victory to the nine percent shift in Fijian votes
from the Alliance to the Labour Party.7
The election resulted in the formation of a new multiracial coalition
cabinet, headed by Dr. Timoci Bavadra, a Fijian, as Prime Minister with
an NFP Indian, Harish Sharma, as his deputy. The Bavadra cabinet
included six Fijians, seven Indians, and one part-European. Although
this composition could not have had much effect on the Fijian-domi-
nated Senate or other areas of traditional Fijian advantages, it poten-
tially might have affected Fiji's policies and the destinies of the voters,
both Indian and Fijian.
D. The First Coup
Protest demonstrations occurred following the 1987 election and crea-
tion of the Bavadra cabinet. A strong racist and anti-Indian movement,
called the Taukei Movement, which is known for demanding a political
system composed exclusively of ethnic Fijians, repeatedly organized
6. 39 I.CJ. REV., supra note 2, at 5.
7. See Ram Swarup, The Sad Plight of Fiji Indians, INDIAN EXPRESS (New Delhi),
Sept. 23, 1989, at 4.
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those protests. On May 14, 1987, a month after the election, Lt. Col.
Sitiveni Rabuka, the third-ranking Fiji Army officer, led ten masked
soldiers into the Parliament where they arrested Bavadra and other
members of the government and suspended the constitution. Rabuka
claimed he acted to maintain order and prevent racial violence. Unfor-
tunately, the illegal coup did not accomplish these laudable objectives.
Rabuka declared himself head of state. Bavadra's supporters
expressed loud opposition to the seizures, leading Rabuka to abolish
trade unions and ban strikes on May 16. Governor-General Ratu Sir
Penaia Ganilau initially opposed the coup, 8 but soon acquiesced and
began to work with Rabuka to lay the foundation for a new government
in which Rabuka would play a leading role. Ganilau accomplished this
only through joint effort with the Council of Chiefs. It is worth noting
that some observers view the coup as actually a "camouflaged measure
of intra-Fijian tribal and ruling elite protection." 9 There are considera-
ble overlapping party, tribal, regional, feudal, and family connections
between the Alliance's Mara, Ganilau, and Rabuka.10
Under the new government, supposedly established on an interim
basis, Rabuka headed a nineteen-person Council of Advisors containing
six of Rabuka's ministers, including members of the Council of Chiefs.
The new government also added nineteen seats to the House, all
reserved for native Fijians, none of whom would be directly elected.
The Governor-General's new Constitutional Review Committee
approved this last development.
E. The Second Coup
For whatever reason, Gaffilau, himself a Tribal Chief, began proceed-
ings designed to restore some form of parliamentary democracy in Fiji.
An announcement was made on September 22, 1987, that a bipartisan
government would be established and led jointly by Bavadra and former
Prime Minister Mara under the Governor-General's chairmanship. Sup-
porters claimed this government would provide "a framework for a mul-
tiracial society in which the rights and interests of all the communities
are safeguarded." I I
But these actions broke faith with Rabuka and the Great Council.
Rabuka, now promoted to commander of the Fiji Army, had repeatedly
warned that if the objectives of his May coup were not realized, he would
resume full control. On September 26, 1987, he did. One commentator
wrote: "It is deplorable that Colonel Rabuka staged the second coup
when there was a possibility of a settlement to the crisis created by the
first coup." 12
8. Id.
9. Thakur & Wood, supra note 2, at 207.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 210 (quoting the OTAGO DAILY TIMES, Sept. 22, 1987).
12. Cited in 39 I.CJ. REV., supra note 2, at 6.
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Rabuka declared Fiji to be a republic and thus severed its 113-year-
old ties to the Commonwealth. Through a decree, his new regime dis-
solved the courts and declared vacant all judicial appointments made
prior to September 25. The same decree created a judicial advisory
committee empowered to name judges and composed of those loyal to
Rabuka. A similar decree prohibited the courts from questioning any
decrees issued by the military government. Further, the new regime
issued on October 14 the "Fundamental Freedoms Decree 1987," which
stated that "freedom of life, liberty, security of the person and protec-
tion of the law may be restricted by decree in the interests of public
order and morality."' 3
Rabuka later relinquished his office as head of government and
appointed former Governor-General Ganilau as President. Before leav-
ing his political office, Rabuka also appointed a new twenty-member
Council of Ministers, comprised of seventeen Fijians, two Indians, and
one part-European. Ganilau then named Ratu Sir Mara to Prime Minis-
ter, the post the latter had held previously for seventeen years. Two
commentators described Fiji's new Republican government as "an
unabashed assertion of indigenous Fijian hegemony, including the
imposition of strict Methodist sabbatarianism on Fiji's non-Christian
half and increased harassment of Fijian Indians."' 4 A writer for the
Economist said, "the Methodists are the ayatollahs of Pacific Christianity.
After the coups the Methodist Sunday was enforced: no buses, no taxis,
no sport, restaurants closed. Even taking a walk was frowned upon,
except to church."' 5
In March 1988 the new government announced that a cabinet com-
mittee was considering proposals for a new constitution. In so doing,
Prime Minister Mara stated that once a broadly acceptable constitution
with electoral provisions was finalized, elections would be held. He also
said:
We are clear in our perception and firm in our belief that a new con-
stitution will have to ensure the full protection of the fundamental inter-
ests and concerns of the indigenous Fijian people, but at the same time
accommodate on a fair and equitable basis, the position of the other com-
munities in our multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. 16
F. The 1990 Fiji Constitution
In September 1988, the government released a draft constitution 17
under which indigenous Fijian political dominance over other ethnic
groups was ensured. In a formal submission of the draft constitution to
the Fiji Constitution Inquiry and Advisory Committee, Bavadra stated
13. Quoted in id. at 7.
14. Thakur & Wood, supra note 2, at 210.
15. Shameless in Fyji, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 1990, at 34.
16. 40 I.G.J. REv., supra note 2, at 3.
17. Fiji CONsT. (Sept. 1988 draft) [hereinafter Draft Constitution]. The Draft
Constitution comprised 14 chapters, 153 sections, and two schedules.
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on January 6, 1989, on behalf of the National Federation Party and the
Fiji Labour Party Coalition:
The Coalition's position is unequivocal. We totally reject the Draft
Constitution proposed by the Interim Government. It runs contrary to
the principles of democracy and social justice which are central to our
party's philosophy. We are far from alone in this position. As you are
aware, the vast majority of citizens who have made submissions to your
committee have strongly opposed the Draft, as have religious bodies
(among them the Christian churches), the trade unions, and other com-
munity groups including women's organizations. Evidently, the over-
whelming sentiment of Fiji's people reflects a fervent belief in the
principles of democracy, social justice, multi-racialism and religious
tolerance.
Our society has been torn apart by the traumatic events of the last 20
months. People of all communities remain tormented by the many injus-
tices perpetrated since the first military coup and are desperate for a just
political solution that will pave the way for a secure and peaceful future.
As the supreme law of the land, the new constitution holds the key to
securing this. But to do this, it must reflect the values and principles that
its people hold dear. The Draft Constitution is clearly anathema to
these. 18
The Coalition recommended against the adoption of the draft con-
stitution on the ground that "it is profoundly authoritarian, undemo-
cratic, militaristic, racist and feudalistic. It would be derisive and sow
the seeds of terrible violence. It would retard our social and economic
development. It would isolate us from many of our valued neighbours,
the Commonwealth and the international community."1 9 The Coalition
further denounced the draft constitution's electoral system as tainted
"with the same sinister motives of apartheid and the supremacy of one
race to the exclusion of others."'20
Notwithstanding such commentary, with few changes from the draft
constitution, the government promulgated on July 25, 1990, a new con-
stitution "based on racial characteristics." 2 1 The constitution is inher-
ently discriminatory as it provides that indigenous Fijians hold thirty-
seven seats in the seventy-seat lower house of Parliament while the eth-
nic Indians have twenty-seven seats, Rotumans (culturally distinct
Polynesians) one, and other races five. 22 Dominance in the thirty-four-
seat upper house, the Senate, which is an appointed body with review
powers and the right to veto legislation, is even more marked. There,
18. Letter from the National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party Coalition
to the Chairman and Members, Constitutional Advisory and Review Committee (Jan.
6, 1989), in National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party Coalition, Submission
on the Draft Constitution of Fi,Jan. 16, 1989, at i. A copy of the letter is available from
the author.
19. Id. at 1-2.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Minority Power in "Racist" Fiji Constitution, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 26, 1990, at
11.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1991 848, 853 (1992) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT].
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indigenous Fijians hold twenty-four seats, Rotumans one, and the other
groups nine. 23
Other aspects of the constitution that appear to ensure political
supremacy of indigenous Fijians include procedures governing the
selection of the President and the Prime Minister. 24 To illustrate, the
Great Council of Chiefs, a traditional Fijian leadership body, selects
both the President and the Fijian members of the Senate. The President
then chooses the Prime Minister from among the Fijian members of the
lower house.
Although the 1990 Constitution incorporated a Bill of Rights, crit-
ics remained concerned that under the amendment provisions, "indige-
nous Fijians in the lower house would be able, solely on the strength of
their own members, to abrogate constitutional human rights
protections." 25
G. Recent Noteworthy Developments
Between 30,000 and 40,000 Indians fled Fiji after the second coup,
"leaving Fiji's multiracial society about evenly divided between indige-
nous Fijians and ethnic Indians."'2 6 In July 1991, Rabuka, by then a
Major General and army commander, resigned from the military and
became co-Deputy Prime Minister. On December 11, 1991, after being
elected President of the new Fijian Political Party (FPP), he resigned
from the cabinet post.2 7 Then, following the elections held in mid-
1992, Rabuka was elected the country's next Prime Minister.2 8
Fiji's economy, dependent primarily on sugar and tourism, was ini-
tially devastated after the coups but has mostly recovered to "pre-coup
levels." 29 In October 1991, arson and other attacks on Hindu shrines
and temples and a priest revived memories of terrorist assaults on tem-
ples belonging to non-Christians in 1984.30
According to the U.S. Department of State report on Human
Rights, "[p]rincipal human rights problems [in Fiji] in 1991 included the
new Constitution's unequal representation features; several incidents of
discrimination against ethnic Indians and women; inhibitions on free-
dom of speech and press; [and] continued delays in bringing cases to
trial . . . ,,a3 However, Fiji's international isolation after the coups
23. Id.
24. Id. at 853.
25. Id. at 854.
26. Id. at 848.
27. Id.
28. See Mosese Velia, Ratu Mara on Rabuka-Give Him a Chance Says Former PM,
THE FIji TIMEs, June 9, 1992, at 1, col. 1; Ved Nanda, F~ji-Repression Set in Natural
Grandeur, THE DENVER PosT, July 19, 1992, § I, at 4, col. 2.
29. Bob Drogin, Trouble in Paradise: Behind Fiji's Facade, Turmoil Brews, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1991, at 2.
30. Christian Attacks on Hindu Temples Revive Religious Rivalries, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
31. STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 22, at 848.
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appears to be ending, with some recent friendly overtures from Austra-
lia,3 2 France, 33 and New Zealand.
3 4
H. Applicable International Human Rights Law
A. General
An impressive body of international human rights law has developed
since the late 1940s. The Nazi atrocities during the Second World War
led to the realization that international peace and human rights are inex-
tricably intertwined. Consequently, the Allied powers established the
International Military Tribunal3 5 at Nuremberg and tried alleged
offenders for war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity.
The United Nations Charter explicitly recognizes the central role of
human rights in the international arena. For example, Article 55 man-
dates that "the United Nations shall promote: ... universal respect for,
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."' 36 Under Article
56, member states "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in co-operation with the [United Nations] for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55. '"37 In December 1946, the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution affirming "the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Niirn-
berg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." 38
The U.N. in 1948 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, a landmark accomplishment. 39 This standard-setting document
subsequently shaped two more international instruments, which along
with the Declaration have come to be known as the International Bill of
Human Rights. These instruments are the International Covenant on
32. See Michael Perry, Fiji Political Leader Prepared to Change Constitution, REUTERS,
BC cycle, Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File (report of a
meeting between Rabuka and Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in Suva,
Fiji); Evans Encouraged by Rabuka on Constitution, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 4, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
33. See Kalinga Seneviratne, South Pacific: 'Rainbow Warrior Incident' Revives Colonial
Fear, INTER PRESS SERVICE, April 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES
File (The French embassy staff in Suva almost doubled, and the French are building
an $8.6 million arms storage facility for the Fiji military in Suva.)
34. See David Stamp, Flawed Fiji Constitution Better than None, New Zealand Saj's,
REUTERS, BC cycle, Jan. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File
(regarding upcoming trip by New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister McKinnon to
meet Major General Rabuka in Suva. "We would certainly prefer them to go to an
election on that than maintain a government virtually appointed by the military.")
35. 59 Stat. 1544, 1546 (1945).
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
37. Id. art. 56.
38. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the .Vi'nl-
berg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946).
39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at
71 (1948).
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Civil and Political Rights40 and its Optional Protocol4 1 and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 42 under
which states have accepted in treaty form the obligation to protect inter-
national human rights.
B. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
The world community has appropriately continued through treaties and
declarations to extend its reach to influence state and individual conduct
pertaining to human rights. Of particular relevance is the 1966 Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion.43 The genesis of the Convention lay in a 1960 recommendation by
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to the U.N. General Assembly to prepare a convention on
those topics; 44 the recommendation followed renewed acts of anti-semi-
tism in Europe and Latin America. In November 1963, the General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination 4 5 and adopted the Convention itself in 1966.
The Convention invokes in the Preamble the principles "of the dig-
nity and equality inherent in all human beings," which undergird the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
resolves "to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating racial
discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, and to prevent and
combat racist doctrines and practices in order ... to build an interna-
tional community free from all forms of racial segregation and racial dis-
crimination .... "46
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976).
41. Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
42. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into
forceJan. 3, 1976).
43. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention]. For
commentaries, see NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1980); W.M. Reisman, Responses to
Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, I DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29 (1971); Egon Schwelb, The Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 996 (1966).
44. See Report of the Twelfth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/800,
163-66 (1960).
45. Declaration on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904
(XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
46. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 43, preamble.
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In its operative parts the Convention defines racial discrimination
to mean:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.47
The Convention continues:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring
such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however,
that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be con-
tinued after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved.4 8
The Convention expresses "that any doctrine of superiority based
on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable,
socially unjust and dangerous" and finds that "there is no justification
for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere."'49
Furthermore, States Parties to the Convention assume an obligation
to "condemn racial discrimination" and to "pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in
all its forms and promoting understanding among all races .... 50
States Parties specifically undertake to condemn racial discrimination 5 '
and "to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against per-
sons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public
authorities and public institutions" act in accordance with this obliga-
tion.52 To ensure implementation, parties agree to "take effective meas-
ures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend,
rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creat-
ing or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists." 5 3 States
Parties also assume a duty to take affirmative measures to promote
"understanding, tolerance and friendship" among racial and ethnic
groups. 54
47. Id. art. 1 (1).
48. Id. art. 1 (4).
49. Id. preamble.
50. Id. art. 2 (1).
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
53. Id. art. 2(1)(c).
54. Id. art. 7.
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C. Fiji Constitution Versus International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
Unquestionably, the constitution of Fiji blatantly violates the obligations
undertaken by that country, a party to the Convention. By denying non-
indigenous racial groups their equal rights in the governance of Fiji and
by depriving them permanently of this basic right, the Fiji Constitution
creates a permanent underclass.5 5 Having undertaken obligations to
pursue without delay a policy of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination and
to "amend, rescind, or nullify" any domestic legislation that might be
violative of the international standards set by the Convention, the
unelected regime in Fiji is instead endeavoring to perpetuate institution-
alized racism. It has created a racially based structure enshrined in its
Constitution.
Might the Fiji Constitution's provisions fall within the scope of
''special measures" allowed under the Convention to secure "adequate
advancement," development and protection of certain racial groups? 5 6
The answer is an unequivocal negative, for such measures must: 1) be
considered necessary to ensure such groups' equal enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms,5 7 2) not "lead to the maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups,"5 8 and 3) not be continued
after the accomplishment of the objectives for which they were taken.5 9
The constitutional guarantees to indigenous Fijians meet none of these
criteria.
Although Fiji accepted the Convention with a reservation to article
5, which relates to laws governing elections, indigenous land rights, and
education, 60 Fiji cannot rely on this reservataion to limit the scope of its
international obligations under the Convention. Reservations must be
interpreted in a contextual setting. In light of the objective of the Con-
vention-the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination-no reser-
vation incompatible with this purpose may be considered valid.
D. The Right of Self-Determination
The U.N. Charter embodies the principles of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples. 6 1 Self-determination encompasses both external
55. States Parties have undertaken the obligation to prohibit and to eliminate
racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of
[plolitical rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections-to vote
and to stand for election--on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to
take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any
level and to have equal access to public service[.]
Id. art. 5 (c).
56. See id. arts. 1(4), 2(2).
57. Id. art. 1(4).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For the text of the reservation, see Campbell McLachlan, The Fii Constitutional
Crisis of May 1987: A Legal Assessment, 1987 NEw ZEALAND L.J. 175, 181.
61. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 55.
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and internal rights: external self-determination refers to the right of the
people of an independent state to choose their political status in the
international arena, whereas internal self-determination refers to their
choice and selection in the internal arena of the government and
includes the right to be free from discrimination. 62 The International
Court ofJustice has construed the term "peoples" used in article 55 to
include all peoples, irrespective of their political status.6 3
Several subsequent U.N. declarations and instruments have reiter-
ated that the right of self-determination belongs to "all peoples" and
have imposed concomitant duties on all states to respect and uphold the
right. Relevant documents include the 1960 Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,r34 the 1966
International Covenants,6 5 and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the U.N.6 6
The principle of self-determination calls for the enjoyment of equal
rights under law by all peoples in Fiji. This includes the right of the
ethnic Indian community to participate in all the value processes of the
society, including power in the body politic. 67 The disproportionately
strong representation of indigenous Fijians under the 1990 constitution
violates the principle of self-determination applicable to all peoples of
Fiji.
E. Native-Versus-Settler Rights
The generally strained relations between indigenous Fijians and ethnic
Indians relate broadly to the native-versus-settler issue. 68 Should native
Fijians have the right to discriminate against the later-arriving ethnic
Indians? The 1990 Fiji constitution answers the question by propaga-
62. See generally Antonio Cassese, Political Self-Determination-Old Concepts and New
Developments, in U.N. LAw-FUNDAMENTAL RiGHTs 137 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979);
M. Rafiqul Islam, The Proposed Constitutional Guarantee of Indigenous Governmental Power in
Fii: An International Legal Appraisal, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 107, 120-22 (1988) (on self-
determination and its application to the situation in Fiji).
63. See Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Nambia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 15, 57 (June 21, 1971) (Namibia v. South Africa) (advisory
opinion).
64. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514(XV), preamble 2, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1961).
65. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, and Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 42, art. 1.
66. G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), principle V, para. 4 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292,
1296 (1970) ("The establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free asso-
ciation with an independent state, or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.")
67. See generally Ved Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of
Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
68. On this issue, see generally Richard Mulgan, Should Indigenous Peoples Have Spe-
cial Rights?, ORBis 375 (Summer 1989).
Vol 25
1992 Ethnic Conflict in Fiji
ting discriminatory privileges and rights for indigenous Fijians. This
constitutes rejection of a democratic form of government under which
all nationals are guaranteed equal rights. No valid basis exists under
international human rights law for such distinction between earlier and
later arrivals.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the Fiji constitution
violates internationally recognized human rights. In criticizing the con-
stitution, Mauritius' Foreign Minister Paul Berenger said at the U.N.
General Assembly in November 1991, "Isn't it a paradox that at a time
when apartheid is being dismantled at one end of the world, a constitu-
tion with racist attributes unfortunately continues to prevail in Fiji?" 6 9
At the same General Assembly session, Indian Foreign Minister Solanki
called upon the government of Fiji to "join the rest of the world in
enlightened democratic governance. '"70
An eventual solution to the constitutional and ethnic crisis in Fiji
depends on the willingness of that nation's ethnic groups to address
their legitimate concerns in a climate of trust. Peaceful settlement of
their differences is possible through negotiation or through the use of
good offices, mediation, or conciliation efforts by Australia or New Zea-
land. Past grievances must be resolved, but unfortunately there does
not presently exist an adequate international legal framework within
which the conflicting group claims can be reconciled.
69. "Apartheid" Constitution, supra note 5.
70. Id.

